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Abstract: Despite a broad consensus on the need to take into account the value of public 
services in distributional analysis, there is little reliable evidence on how the inclusion of such 
non-cash income actually affects poverty and inequality estimates. In particular, the 
equivalence scales applied to cash income are not necessarily appropriate when including non-
cash income, because the receipt of public services is likely to be associated with particular 
needs. In this paper, we propose a theory-based framework designed to provide a coherent 
evaluation of the distributional impact of local public services. The valuation of public services, 
identification of target groups, allocation of expenditures to target groups, and adjustment for 
differences in needs are derived from a model of local government spending behaviour. Using 
Norwegian data from municipal accounts and administrative registers we find that the inclusion 
of non-cash income reduces income inequality by about 15 percent and poverty rates by almost 
one-third. However, adjusting for differences in needs for public services across population 
subgroups offsets about half the inequality reduction and some of the poverty decrease. 
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1. Introduction 
Most studies of poverty and income inequality focus exclusively on cash income and omit the 
value of public services. Smeeding et al. (1993; p 230) suggest that this practice may be due to 
the fact that “the problems inherent in the measurement, valuation, and imputation of non-cash 
income to individual households on the basis of micro data files are formidable.” Nevertheless, 
the conventional focus on cash income yields an incomplete and perhaps misleading picture of 
the distribution of economic well-being, not least because about half of welfare state transfers 
in developed countries are in-kind benefits such as health insurance, education and other 
services (Garfinkel et al., 2006). 
 
As the tax burden levied on households represent a deduction from their disposable income, it 
is important to account for the services which governments provide to households through 
these taxes. The omission of public services from the definition of income may call into 
question the validity of income comparisons across population subgroups, over time, and 
between countries. Furthermore, this omission can have important policy implications given the 
wide range of policies that aim to fight poverty and reduce inequality. For these reasons, the 
Canberra Group (Expert Group on Household Income Statistics, 2001) and Atkinson et al. 
(2002) have expressed the need for more research on the distributional impact of public 
services. Definition and measurement of public in-kind benefits require solutions of conceptual 
as well as practical problems, which have been raised and explored in a number of studies.1 
While these studies represent a significant step forward, our aim is to further develop a 
framework for evaluating the distributional impact of public services.  
 
Extended income. The term extended income denotes the sum of disposable cash income and 
non-cash income, where non-cash income accounts for the value of local public services 
received by different individuals and households. The measurement of non-cash income 
involves three steps: Valuation, allocation, and adjustment for differences in needs through the 
use of equivalence scales. Our paper departs from the previous literature in that a model of 
local government spending behaviour forms the basis for each step. This framework therefore 
provides a coherent framework for evaluating the distributional impact of public services.  
                                                     
1 See e.g. Smeeding (1977), Ruggles and O’Higgins (1981), Gemmell (1985), Smeeding et al. (1993), Evandrou et al. (1993), 
Ruggeri et al. (1994), Slesnick (1996), Antoninis and Tsakloglou (2001) and Garfinkel et al. (2006). 
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Valuation and allocation. From a model of local government behaviour, we derive a linear 
expenditure system that proves useful in explaining differences in spending of municipalities 
across sectors and between population subgroups. In particular, the allocation of public service 
expenditure to households is based on estimates of sector-specific minimum quantities assigned 
to different target groups. These estimates are identified from information on sector-specific 
expenditures and the demographic characteristics of the population in each municipality. The 
estimation of the model is based on detailed local government accounts and community 
characteristics for Norwegian municipalities.  
 
In our main analysis, we follow the previous literature closely in valuating public services at 
the cost of their provision. However, we perform a sensitivity analysis in which the value of 
public services is adjusted by estimated price indices that account for variation in production 
costs across municipalities, in line with the suggestions of Aaberge and Langørgen (2006). 
 
Needs adjustment. The importance of accounting for needs and economies of scale in 
households’ in analyses of cash income distributions is universally acknowledged. As argued 
by Radner (1997), however, equivalence scales designed to account for needs and economies of 
scale in cash income are not necessarily appropriate when analyzing extended income. For 
instance, the elderly tend to utilize health services more often than younger people due to 
different health status, and children have a genuine need for education. As a consequence, 
studies using the equivalence scales designed for cash income risk overestimating the 
equivalent incomes of groups with relatively high needs for public services.  A contribution of 
this paper is to relax the assumption that the relative needs of different subgroups remain 
unchanged when the definition of income changes. 
 
To derive an equivalence scale for extended income, we use the minimum expenditures 
identified in the spending model of the local governments as a basis for assessing the relative 
needs for public services of different target groups. The justification of this approach is that the 
estimated minimum expenditures can be considered as a result of central government 
regulations, expert opinion, and/or a consensus among local governments about how much 
spending the different target groups need, given the budget constraint that the municipalities 
face. The fact that the equivalence scale is based on the same model used to derive the 
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allocation method does not imply that the allocated non-cash income is exactly offset by the 
needs of the different target groups. The reasons are threefold. First, the recipients live in 
different municipalities which have different economic capacity to produce public services. 
Second, local governments have discretion in their spending across service sectors, as well as in 
spending priorities on different target groups. And third, since the needs-adjusted equivalence 
scale is defined as a weighted average of the scale for cash income and the scale for non-cash 
income, the needs adjustment is a function of both cash and non-cash income. This means that 
individuals who are equal with respect to needs for public services and who belong to the same 
municipality, are affected differently by the needs adjustment if their cash incomes differ. 
 
The Norwegian case. Norway emerges as an interesting country for studying the distributional 
impact of local public services for reasons beyond data availability and quality. First of all, 
Norway is a relatively large country with a dispersed population and relatively large public 
sector where local governments play an important role in the provision of public services. In 
Norway, the central government has introduced an equalization program in the grant system for 
local governments. However, important income components such as income from hydroelectric 
power plants and regional development transfers are not accounted for in the equalization 
scheme. Moreover, there is variation in local government spending across service sectors, as 
well as in spending priorities on different target groups (Aaberge and Langørgen, 2003). 
Consequently, some municipalities may be more effective than others in fighting poverty and 
reducing inequality, either because they can provide a generally higher level of services or 
because they are targeting vulnerable groups. 
 
Outline. Section 2 discusses the model of local government spending behaviour and the 
methods used to valuate and allocate public services, before justifying the equivalence scales 
for non-cash income and extended income. Section 3 describes the empirical implementation of 
these methods and reports estimation results from the model of local government spending. 
Section 4 presents empirical results showing the impact of local public services on poverty and 
income inequality estimates, before Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Local public services 
This section describes the model of local government spending behaviour, before presenting 
the methods used to valuate and allocate public services and derive the equivalence scales for 
non-cash income and extended income. 
 
It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the distributional impact 
of public services that are not provided by local governments, most notably central government 
administration and infrastructure, defence, police services, secondary and post-secondary 
education, and public hospitals. Though figuring out how to value, allocate, and needs adjust 
those services is important, it is left for future research. 
2.1. Spending behaviour of local governments  
As was demonstrated by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003), the linear expenditure system (LES) 
proves helpful in explaining differences in the spending behaviour of Norwegian 
municipalities, provided that account is taken for heterogeneity in expenditure needs and in 
local preferences for allocation of income to different services. To account for heterogeneity in 
preferences over service sectors and target groups of local governments, we use the following 
specification of a Stone-Geary utility function,  
(2.1)    
1 1
log ,
s k
ij ij
ij
i j ij
x
V
  
       
 
where V  is utility of the local government, and ijx  is the production of service i per person of 
target group j. The parameter ij  is interpreted as the minimum quantity per person of service i 
targeted to group j and can also be considered as a measure of the local government’s 
assessment of the need for different services targeted to different population subgroups. The 
parameter ij  is interpreted as the marginal budget share for spending on group j in service 
sector i. 
 
When the local government is assumed to allocate resources both to different service sectors 
and to different target groups, the budget constraint can be specified as 
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(2.2)    
1 1 1 1
,
s k s k
i ij j ij j
i j i j
y x z u z
   
     
 
where y  is total per capita income of the local government, i  is the cost per unit in the 
production of service i, jz  is the population share that belongs to target group j and ij i iju x  is 
the spending per person on service i for target group j. Thus, ij ju z  is spending of type i targeted 
to group j measured per person in the population. By maximizing utility in (2.1) subject to the 
budget constraint (2.2), we obtain the following linear expenditure system,  
 
(2.3)   1 1
1 1
, 1,2,..., , 1,2,..., ,
1,
s k
ij j i ij j ij i ij j
i j
s k
ij
i j
u z z y z i s j k    

 
 
       



 
 
where 
1 1
s k
i ij j
i j
y z 
 
  is discretionary income, that is, the income remaining when the 
minimum expenditures have been covered. Minimum expenditure in sector i targeted to group j 
is defined by i ij jz  . Exclusion restrictions of the type 0ij   capture the fact that each target 
group does not necessarily receive all services. 
 
Since allocation of spending to target groups, iju , is normally not reported in accounting data 
we identify the parameters of the model by imposing the following multiplicative structure on 
the marginal budget shares, 
 
(2.4)     
1
1
, 1,2,..., , 1,2,..., ,
1,
1, 1,2,..., ,
ij i ij
s
i
i
k
ij
j
i s j k
i s
  




  

 


 
 
where i  is the marginal budget share for service sector i, and ij  is the share of sector-specific 
discretionary income in service sector i that is allocated to target group j. Inserting (2.4) into 
(2.3) and aggregating across target groups within each service sector yield 
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(2.5)    
1 1 1
, 1,2,..., ,
k s k
i i ij j i i ij j
j i j
u z y z i s    
  
          
 
where 
1
k
i ij jj
u u z  is expenditure (per capita) in service sector i, which is reported in the 
accounting data of the municipalities. The total per capita minimum quantity in sector i is 
defined by 
1
k
i ij jj
z  . Thus, owing to the additive properties of the linear expenditure 
system, it is possible to estimate minimum quantities for different target groups and different 
service sectors. By allowing the minimum quantity parameters ij  to vary across target groups, 
we obtain a flexible modelling framework that accounts for different needs for public services 
across different demographic groups. We also allow the unit cost parameters i  and the 
marginal budget share parameters i  to vary with observed variables. However, for the purpose 
of identification we assume that certain variables affect unit costs but not minimum quantities. 
This assumption helps to clarify the distinction between unit costs and service needs of the 
population.2 Specifically, we introduce the following specification for the unit cost parameters: 
 
(2.6)    0 1 ( ) , 1,2,..., ,i i ih h h
h
p p i s          
 
where hp  is a variable that affects unit costs in at least one of the service sectors and hp  is the 
national mean of variable hp . For instance, we assume that settlement pattern and economies 
of scale affect unit costs, which means that small municipalities with a dispersed population are 
allowed to face different unit costs in service production compared to other municipalities. By 
contrast, the sector-specific minimum quantities ( i ) depend on population shares of different 
target groups which capture the local need for services such as child care, education and care 
for the elderly. 
 
Equation (2.6) is expressed in terms of variables measured as deviations from national average 
levels. Consequently, the parameter 0i  can be interpreted as the average price level in service 
                                                     
2 Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) used a different approach by replacing the minimum expenditure terms with linear functions 
of observed municipality characteristics. 
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sector i. Minimum quantities and unit costs are, however, only identified up to a multiplicative 
constant, since multiplying unit costs by a constant and dividing subsistence output by the same 
constant cannot be traced from the reduced form parameters of the model. Natural scales of 
measurement for output and unit costs of local public services are not available. However, since 
expenditures are defined by the product of output and unit costs an appropriate scale emerges 
by normalizing the average price levels to 1 ( sii ,...,2,1,10  ). This means that unit cost i  
is defined as a price index with the average for the entire country equal to 1. Moreover, it 
follows that service outputs are measured in money terms and are interpreted as monetary 
values of output for an average price level. Note, however, that the normalization of prices 
imposes no restrictions on the model other than a choice of measurement scale for prices and 
outputs.  
 
Heterogeneity in marginal budget shares is due to different preferences across municipalities 
for allocating discretionary income to service sectors. Let 
 
(2.7)     
0
0
1
1
, ( 1,2,..., ),
1,
0 0,
i i ih h
h
s
i
i
s
ih
i
t i s
for all h
  




  

 



 
 
where ht  is a taste variable that affects the preferences for allocating discretionary income. For 
instance, the party composition of the local government council may influence such service 
priorities. This specification allows for different political priorities over service sectors across 
local governments. Such priorities are assumed to affect the allocation of discretionary income 
to services sectors, whereas the minimum quantities are assumed to be determined by variation 
in local needs that are reflected in the relative size of different target groups. 
2.2 Allocation method  
As noted above, the allocation of spending to different services is reported in local government 
accounts. Yet the allocation of spending to target groups is not observed, reflecting data 
availability in most countries. This means that marginal budget share ij  for different target 
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groups are not identified. A feasible solution to this problem is to utilize the information 
captured by the minimum quantities ij  to determine the relative priority of different target 
groups. By assuming that the sector-specific discretionary income is allocated to target groups 
by the same proportions as minimum expenditures, that is,    
(2.8)    
1
, 1, 2,..., , 1, 2,..., ,ij jij k
ij jj
z
i s j k
z
 
    
 
the local government model is fully identified. Thus, the parameter ij  can be interpreted as the 
proportion of the minimum quantity (and minimum expenditure) in sector i received by target 
group j. Inserting (2.8), (2.4) and (2.5) in (2.3) gives the following allocation of spending to 
target groups  
(2.9)    
1
, 1, 2,..., , 1, 2,..., ,ij jij j ik
ij jj
z
u z u i s j k
z


    
 
which means that sector-specific spending is allocated to target groups by the same proportions 
as minimum quantities (and minimum expenditures). Note that the share of expenditure 
received by a target group is an increasing function of the target group’s share of the 
population, as well as in the estimated minimum quantity per person in the target group. As is 
demonstrated by (2.9), estimates of the target-group-specific expenditures iju  can be derived 
from estimates of the minimum quantities ij , and from data on sector-specific expenditures 
and proportions of the population belonging to various target groups. 
2.3 Equivalence scales 
Equivalence scales play an important role in analysis of inequality and poverty as a means for 
achieving interpersonal comparability of cash income. Both the methods for deriving 
equivalence scales and the normative assumptions made by them are subject to considerable 
debate. While theoretically justified equivalence scales can be constructed from the cost 
functions for households with different demographic characteristics, most empirical analysis 
typically use more pragmatic scales adjusting crudely for differences in household size and 
composition (see e.g. Coulter et. al. 1992). In either case, the equivalence scales designed for 
cash income are not necessarily appropriate when analyzing extended income, because the 
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receipt of public services (like education for children and care for the elderly) are associated 
with particular needs.3 If we were to use the equivalence scales designed for cash income on 
extended income, we risk overestimating the equivalent extended income for individuals with 
high needs for public services.  
 
To derive an equivalence scale for extended income, consider a social planner employing the 
minimum expenditures identified in the spending model of the local governments as a basis for 
assessing the relative needs of different target groups. The justification for this approach is that 
the estimated minimum expenditures can be considered as a result of central government 
regulations, expert opinion, or a consensus among local governments about how much 
spending the different target groups need, given the budget constraint that the municipalities 
face. Moreover, we assume that the social planner uses the same functional form for measuring 
individual well-being produced by public services as is used by local governments to decide the 
spending on public services.  
 
However, while the marginal budget share parameters of the utility function (2.1) of the local 
governments allow for heterogeneity in spending across sectors as well as across target groups, 
the aim of the social planner is to employ a social evaluation framework that treats individuals 
symmetrically and independent of where they live after adjusting for relevant non-income 
heterogeneity. Thus, we replace the marginal budget share parameters ij  of the utility function 
(2.1) with parameters that solely depend on the group- and sector-specific minimum 
expenditures i ij jz  .  The following specification 
(2.10)  
0 1
, 0,1,..., , 1, 2,..., ,i ij jij s k
i ij ji j
z
i s j k
z
    
     
 
appears particular attractive since it captures the needs structure exhibited by the minimum 
quantity parameters. Note that sector 0 is added as a composite good that includes consumption 
financed by the cash income, where j0  is the minimum quantity of cash income per person for 
target group j and 0  represents the price index of private consumption. Next, by inserting 
                                                     
3 For example, the equivalence scales estimated by Jones and O’Donnell (1995) and Zaidi and Burchardt (2005) imply that the 
disable have relatively high needs, so their cash and non-cash incomes should be correspondingly adjusted when evaluating 
the distribution of extended income.  
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(2.10) in (2.1) we get 
(2.11)    
0 1
log
s k
ij ij
ij
i j ij
x
W
  
       , 
 
which will be considered as the evaluation function of the social planner.  Note that sector 0 is 
added as a composite good that includes consumption financed by the cash income.  The cost 
function of the social planner is given by 
 
(2.12) 
01 02,...,, 0 1 0 1
1 1
( , , ) min log .
sk
s k s k
i ij j ij ij
i ij j s kx x x i j i j iji ij ji j
z x
C w x z w
z
         
          
  π z  
 
where 1 2 k( z ,z ,...,z )z  gives the relative distribution of the population on target groups. Thus, 
from the social planner’s point of view ( , , )C w π z  gives the minimum cost (per capita) to get 
welfare level w  for a population characterized by k target groups. By solving the minimization 
problem (2.12) we find that the cost function C admits the following decomposition 
 
(2.13)       
0 1
, , 1
s k
w
i ij j
i j
C w e z 
 
  π z . 
 
Let ( , )jC w π  be defined by 
(2.14)    
0
, 1 , 1,2,...,
s
w
j i ij
i
C w e j k 

  π . 
Inserting (2.14) in (2.13) yields the following decomposition of the cost function  
 
(2.15)       
1
, , ,
k
j j
j
C w C w z

π z π . 
 
Due to the Stone-Geary structure of the social evaluation function W defined by (2.11), it is 
straightforward to prove that ( , )jC w π  can be considered as a separate cost function for a 
member of target group j. The cost function jC  shows how much money the social planner has 
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to spend on each person in target group j  to ensure that the social welfare level w is attained 
for each member of target group j ( 1 2j , ,...,k ). Thus, the associated price-adjusted target 
group-specific equivalence scale jNPA  is defined by 
 
(2.16)  
 
  0 0 0
0 0 0
,
, 1,2,..,
,
s s s
i ij i ij ij
j i i i
j s s s
r
ir ij ir
i i i
C w
NPA j k
C w
    
  
  
  
   
  
  
π
1
, 
 
where the reference target group r is a single adult below 67 years of age,4  and the 
(hypothetical) reference municipality is characterized by a price vector with all prices equal to 
1. It follows from (2.16) that the equivalence scale jNPA  is independent of the income levels 
of the target groups.5 Note that the jNPA  accounts for needs for public services as well as for 
needs for cash income. Since  
0 0
s s
j i ij ij
i i
   
 
   can be interpreted as a target-group-specific 
price index and 
0 0
s s
j ij ir
i i
NA  
 
   as an average needs-adjusted equivalence scale, jNPA  
admits the following convenient decomposition 
(2.17) j j jNPA NA  . 
 
 In the general case the equivalence scale depends on variation in the price level across 
municipalities. The reason for this is that residents in high-cost municipalities require higher 
spending to reach the same standard of living as residents in low-cost municipalities. To pin 
down the distributional impact of allowing for changes in the relative needs of subgroups when 
we move from cash to extended income, we assume that prices do not vary across 
municipalities, which means that j jNPA NA . To assess the importance of allowing for 
variation in production costs, we will allow for differences in unit costs using the more general 
jNPA equivalence scale. 
                                                     
4 Moreover, the reference household is assumed not to possess any of the characteristics that trigger additional expenditure 
needs, such as unemployment, refugee status, divorce or poverty. 
5 This structure, called independence of base utility, has previously been discussed by Lewbel (1989) and Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1993). 
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Another convenient decomposition property of the equivalence scale defined by (2.16) is given 
by 
 
(2.18)  
,,...,2,1    ,
,,...,2,1    ,
,
,,...,2,1    ,)1(
1
1
0
00
0
0
kjNC
kjCI
kjNCCINPA
s
i ir
s
i iji
j
r
j
j
s
i ir
r
r
jrjrj

















 
 
where jCI  is the equivalence scale for cash income, jNC  is the scale for non-cash income, and 
r  is the weight that is given to cash income in the combined NPA scale for extended income. 
While the NC scale is a function of the minimum expenditures identified in the spending model 
of local governments, we will follow the previous literature in using a pragmatic scale for CI . 
In our main results, we will apply the much used EU scale for cash income, but as a robustness 
check we employ the OECD scale instead. The combined NA scale (and NPA scale) requires 
assessment of the weight r . The empirical implementation in Section 3.4 discusses two 
alternative methods for determining this parameter.  
 
The equivalence scales in equations (2.17) and (2.18) can be defined both on individual and 
household level. As there are no clear-cut economies of scale in the consumption of public non-
cash income, such as education and health care, the local public services are treated as private 
goods in the NC scale for public services. The NC scale on the household level is computed by 
summation of individual scales over all individuals that belong to a given household. The 
parameter r  in equation (2.18) does not differ across individuals or municipalities. Thus, the 
parameter is not affected by aggregation over households. Since the EU scale is defined on the 
household level, it can be weighted together with the NC scale aggregated to the household 
level, using the parameter r  as the weight for cash income. It follows that economies of scale 
in consumption are included in the NA scale (and NPA scale) to the degree that the equivalence 
scale for cash income (the EU scale) accounts for economies of scale. A comparison of the EU 
scale and the estimated NA scales based on data from Norway is given in Section 4.2. 
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3. Empirical implementation 
This section describes the empirical implementation of the methods outlined above using 
Norwegian data. We also outline the methods used to evaluate the income distribution. 
Specifically, Section 3.1 describes the data and some definitional issues. Estimation results of 
the model for local government spending are given in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes how 
the value of public services is allocated to individuals. Section 3.4 defines equivalent income 
measures that are utilized in the analysis of income distribution. Inequality measures and 
poverty thresholds are defined in Section 3.5.   
3.1 Data 
Population of study. Our analytical sample is based on administrative registers with household, 
geographic, and demographic information for the entire resident population of Norway in 2007. 
Table 3.1 shows the population composition by demographic and geographic characteristics. 
Roughly four out of five people live in urban municipalities, including the capital Oslo. 
Furthermore, nearly three-quarters of the population live as couples. In addition, immigrants 
make up almost one-tenth of the population.    
Table 3.1 Population of study 
Population group Population share (%) 
Single parents 9 
Couples with children 49 
Couples without children 19 
Singles, 44 years or below 7 
Singles, 45-66 years 5 
Singles, 67 years or above 6 
Household type 
Other households 5 
Urban 70 
Oslo 12 Centrality 
Rural 18 
Non-immigrants 91 
Ethnic origin 
Immigrants 9 
Population size (millions) 4.7 
 
Public services and expenditure. Local government accounts in Norway provide detailed 
information on sector-specific expenditure. Table 3.2 summarizes the differences in sector-
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specific per capita public spending across the 431 municipalities in Norway in 2007. We see 
that the largest expenditure component is care for the elderly and disabled (long-term care), 
closely followed by primary education. These two sectors account, on average, for more than 
half of the total expenditure of municipalities. We also note that there are considerable 
differences in per capita public spending across municipalities in all service sectors.  
Table 3.2 Public spending per capita on different services across municipalities  
Public spending per capita 
Service sector 
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Administration 569 329 219 2 891 
Primary education 1 155 238 756 2 117 
Other education 84 49 5 557 
Child care 435 100 243 962 
Health care 253 127 108 967 
Social services 72 45 0 284 
Child protection 127 54 14 506 
Long-term care 1 500 468 633 5 066 
Culture 202 142 73 2 101 
Infrastructure 225 289 0 3 183 
All services 4 396 1 553 2 051 15 451 
Note: Numbers are calculated by averaging spending per capita across municipalities for each sector. All numbers are in Euros 
(exchange rate of 9 NOK per Euro is used).  
Table 3.4 shows our classification of local public services into ten different sectors, and the 
associated target groups. From the administrative registers, we can compute the population 
shares of different target groups in every municipality. We therefore have a one-to-one 
correspondence between our population of study and the population shares used in the 
estimation of the model of local government spending.  
 
The specification of target groups aims at producing mutually exclusive groups within each 
service sector. By not including partially overlapping target groups, we are able to avoid 
misleading double-counting of minimum quantities, while at the same time accounting properly 
for interaction effects pertaining to population subgroups that share more than one of the 
characteristics that are used by local governments to target the public services. 
 
Cash and extended income. Table 3.3 defines our cash income and extended income measure. 
We see that the cash income measure includes earnings, self-employment income, capital 
income, and public cash transfers, from which direct taxes are subtracted. We use the term 
extended income to denote the sum of cash income and the value of in-kind benefits provided 
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through public services. The data on cash income is based on Tax Assessment Files, which are 
collected from tax records and other administrative registers, rather than interviews and self-
reporting methods. The coverage and reliability of Norwegian data on cash income are 
considered to be very high, as is documented by the fact that the quality of such national 
datasets of income received the highest rating in a data quality survey in the Luxembourg 
Income Study database (Atkinson et al., 1995).  
Table 3.3 Definition of cash income and extended income 
Market income      =  Employment income (earnings, self-employment income)  
+  Capital income (interest, stock dividends, sale of stocks) 
Total income         =  Market income 
+ Public cash transfers (e.g. old-age pension, unemployment and disability 
benefits, child benefits and single parents benefits, social assistance) 
Cash income         =  Total income – direct taxes  
Extended income  =  Cash income + non-cash income  
3.2 Estimation results 
The estimation of the model defined by (2.5)–(2.7) is based on detailed local government 
accounts and community characteristics for Norwegian municipalities in 2007. The model 
accounts for spending on the ten service sectors displayed in Table 3.4, and in the estimation 
we also include the budget surplus (net operating result) as a sector in the model. The budget 
surplus is treated as a residual sector, which means that the model is representing an extended 
linear expenditure system, see Lluch (1973). Expenditures are defined exclusive of user fees 
and employer payroll taxes, and are measured on a per capita basis in the model specification. 
We estimate the model simultaneously by the method of maximum likelihood. 
 
The minimum quantity parameters are displayed in Table 3.4, the unit cost parameters are 
displayed in Table 3.5, and Table A.1 in Appendix A presents estimates of the marginal budget 
share parameters. Importantly, the parameter estimates are statistically significant and of the 
expected signs.  
 
Minimum quantity parameters. Consider the parameter estimates reported in Table 3.4, 
showing the increase in minimum quantity when the target group is increased by one person. 
One main finding is that there is substantial variation in the minimum quantity estimates across 
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target groups. Below we discuss the identified target groups and associated minimum quantities 
in each of the ten service sectors. 
Table 3.4 Estimates of minimum quantity parameters 
Sector Function Target groups Parameter estimate 
T- 
stat. 
R2-
adj. 
Administration 
All local 
administrative 
services  
All residents 251 10.42 0.88 
Primary 
education 
Ten years of 
primary education 
Population 6-12 years of age  
Population 13-15 years of age 
5 414 
8 694 
11.87 
9.16 
0.79 
Other 
education 
After-school 
education and 
adult education 
Population 6-15 years of age 
Recently domiciled refugees 20-59 years of age 
255 
6 202 
7.23 
7.71 
0.36 
Child care 
Municipal and 
publicly subsidized 
kindergartens 
Children 1-5 years with full-time employed parents 
Remaining children 1-5 years of age 
10 650 
4 405 
20.43 
13.73 
0.60 
Health care 
All health services 
provided by 
general 
practitioners 
All residents 124 11.14 0.75 
Social 
services 
Social services 
targeted towards 
disadvantaged 
individuals 
Poor and unemployed 16-59 years of age 
Remaining recently domiciled refugees 0-59 years  
Remaining divorced or separated 16-59 years 
17 030 
6 493 
1 258 
5.43 
10.40 
10.11 
0.54 
Child 
protection 
All services related 
to child protection 
Poor children 0-15 years with lone parent 
Poor children 0-15 years with couple parents 
Non-poor children 0-15 years with lone parent 
Non-poor children 0-15 years with couple parents 
3 893 
2 048 
2 115 
163 
3.79 
3.49 
4.64 
2.45 
0.13 
Long-term 
care 
Nursing homes 
and home care for 
the elderly and 
disabled 
Population 0-66 years of age 
Population 67-79 years of age 
Population 80-89 years of age 
Population 90 years and above 
Mentally disabled 16 years and above 
347 
2 721 
5 452 
14 655 
45 119 
4.33 
2.70 
2.92 
2.57 
12.05 
0.84 
Culture 
Sports, arts, 
museums, 
libraries, cinemas 
and churches 
All residents 91 8.38 0.67 
Infrastructure 
Water supply,  
road maintenance, 
sewage and 
refuse collection   
All residents 22 0.90 0.58 
Note: All parameter estimates are in Euros (a fixed exchange rate of 9 NOK per Euro is used). Number of observations = 378. 
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Consider first primary schools, which are compulsory for children 6–15 years of age. It follows 
that service provision increases as a function of the number of children in this age group. We 
also see that children aged 6–12 years receive not as much services as children aged 13–15 
years. This difference is due to the fact that the latter group faces more extensive and 
demanding lessons, which requires teachers with higher qualifications. 
 
Local governments operate a few other education services that are not included in the sector for 
primary education. The service sector “Other education” includes day care facilities for 
schoolchildren, music schools, special schools and adult education. Except for adult education, 
the relevant group that benefits from “Other education” is the age group 6-15 years. Adult 
education is particularly directed toward recently domiciled refugees in the age group 20-59 
years. Recently domiciled refugees include refugees who have resided in Norway less than five 
years. 
 
Moving on to the child-care sector, we see that the service provision increases in the population 
share of children in pre-school age (1-5 years). The target group is divided into children with 
and without full-time employed parents. The marginal cost is higher for the group with full-
time employed parents, since these families depend more on professional day-care services, 
which contributes to higher demand for and coverage in kindergartens. 
 
Next, consider child protection sector, which includes investigation of alleged child abuse, 
orphan homes, foster care, adoption services, and services aimed at supporting at-risk families 
so they can remain intact. Children less than 16 years of age are the primary target group for 
child protection. The estimation results show that the risk and spending is highest among 
children that belong to a poor family with a lone parent. Risk and spending levels are 
intermediate for children that are poor with couple parents or non-poor with a lone parent. The 
lowest spending levels are found among children that are non-poor with couple parents. Poor 
families include those with incomes below half of median income, where incomes are defined 
by after-tax private incomes exclusive of social services cash transfers. In-kind benefits are not 
included in the income definition when defining poor families that are highly prone to receive 
some of the municipal services. 
 
A large share of spending in the social services sector is cash transfers to support families with 
insufficient means from other sources of income. The sector also includes some in-kind 
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benefits that aim to prevent alcohol and drugs abuse and other social problems. The potential 
recipients are either poor, unemployed, refugees or divorced/separated, or possess different 
combinations of those characteristics. To account for interaction effects between different 
characteristics, the potential recipients are divided into mutually exclusive target groups that 
include all possible combinations of the above mentioned characteristics. The estimates for 
each subgroup are used to identify target groups with high, intermediate and low risk and 
spending. The resulting target group classification shows that the poor who are also 
unemployed is a high-risk group for receiving social services. The second target group that 
receives intermediate spending per person is recently domiciled refugees. The third target 
group that receives a lower, although significant spending level, is the divorced and separated. 
 
Long-term care includes nursing homes, ambulant nurses and home care. The potential 
recipients are the elderly and disabled. Since elderly people have a higher probability of 
becoming recipients of long-term care, spending needs are higher for the elderly than for 
younger people. Subsistence output is increasing with age, and is highest for the elderly 90 
years and above. By contrast, spending needs per person is much lower in the age group 0-66 
years. However, the group of mentally disabled, which by and large is a subgroup of the age 
group 0-66 years, is included to account for the additional cost from being mentally disabled. 
This additional minimum expenditure is rather high, and is above 45,000 Euros per person in 
the mentally disabled group. 
 
When it comes to administration, municipal health care, culture, and infrastructure, the target 
group is taken to be the whole population. The financing of local public health services is 
shared with the central government such that local governments pay for a basic capacity, whilst 
additional costs due to utilization and health care needs are financed through the national social 
security system. Thus the local government minimum quantity for health care does not vary as 
a function of socio-demographic variables. Similarly, for culture, administration and 
infrastructure, we have not identified any characteristic that yields variation in minimum 
quantities. Thus, the estimated minimum quantity is a constant, which means that the entire 
population is treated as the relevant target group. 
 
Unit cost parameters. Consider the estimated parameters for variables that affect unit costs, 
displayed in Table 3.5. These parameters form the basis for the price-adjusted equivalence 
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scales in equation (2.16) and the construction of price indices in equation (2.6). We see that 
there is significant variation in unit costs in three of the service sectors: administration, primary 
education and health care. 
Table 3.5 Estimates of unit cost parameters 
 Administration Primary education Health care 
Inverse population size 1.48 (8.77) 0.26 (8.25) 1.19 (6.53) 
Distance to municipal sub-district center - - 0.16 (8.55) 0.28 (4.97) 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. Number of observations = 378. 
The estimated unit costs in these three service sectors are decreasing as a function of population 
size. The chosen functional form is the inverse population size, which captures that the 
decreasing function is convex and close to zero when population is sufficiently large. The 
positive impact of inverse population size on unit costs may originate from fixed costs in the 
operation of local governments. Significant parameter estimates for inverse population size are 
taken as proof of economies of scale. An important reason for smaller municipalities to have 
higher unit costs is that they use a larger share of resources on administration. Furthermore, 
class sizes are in general smaller in smaller municipalities, implying more teachers per student 
and therefore higher costs. Similarly, to maintain a basic capacity of primary physicians in 
smaller municipalities the physician-patient ratio becomes relatively large, which increases the 
unit cost. 
 
We also find that greater dispersion of the local settlement pattern increases unit costs in 
education and health care. The estimated positive relationships are interpreted as reflecting 
costs of providing services on a decentralized level. For example, when it comes to primary 
education, municipalities with a high dispersion of settlement tend to supply a decentralized 
school structure with relatively few students per school and rather small class sizes. The aim is 
to provide a school structure that does not impose unreasonable travelling distances on the 
school children. Similarly, patients in primary health care are also entitled to have a physician 
within reasonable travelling distance. The costs to maintain such services are therefore higher 
in sparsely populated areas. To capture dispersion of settlement in the municipality, we use an 
explanatory variable defined as the average distance to the centre of the municipal sub-district. 
Note that the distance variable has no significant effect in the administration sector. 
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The price indices defined in equation (2.6) reflect the relative differences across municipalities 
in unit costs for providing different services. Summary statistics for the estimated price indices 
are reported in Table 3.6. Note that the mean values are above 1 because municipalities with 
different population sizes are given equal weights, which means that weights per capita are 
higher in smaller municipalities. Small municipalities are found to encounter high unit costs 
due to economies of scale and dispersed settlement. Moreover, we find large variation across 
municipalities in unit costs, particularly in administration and health care. 
Table 3.6 Variation in unit costs across municipalities 
 Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Administration 1.41 0.64 0.87 7.85 
Primary education 1.13 0.17 0.94 2.52 
Health care 1.43 0.58 0.83 6.37 
Note: Number of observations = 431. 
3.3 Allocating local public services 
In line with the allocation rule in equation (2.9), we use the above estimates to allocate the 
values of local public services to individuals. We assume that people who live in the same 
municipality and belong to the same target group, receive equal non-cash income. Specifically, 
the in-kind transfer from sector i received by each member of group j is then given by the 
estimate of iju , which may vary across municipalities. Thus, variation in allocated in-kind 
benefits across people is partly due to differences in individual characteristics that trigger 
expenditure needs. In addition, there is variation in local government spending across service 
sectors, as well as in spending priorities on different target groups.  
 
The target groups that are treated as recipients in the analysis may deviate from the group of 
actual recipients. There are two reasons for this. First, we usually do not observe the group of 
actual recipients. Hence, the identified target groups serve to approximate groups of actual 
recipients. Although the simulated recipients are not necessarily the same as the actual 
recipients, a good approximation of the underlying distributional profiles of public services 
should be obtained, provided that the relevant characteristics of recipients are taken into 
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account.6 Second, in line with Smeeding et al. (1993), the services child protection, social 
services, health care, and long-term care are viewed as insurance benefits received by everyone 
covered by the insurance scheme, regardless of actual use. The received expenditure of such 
services is interpreted as expected non-cash income, which depends on the risk of becoming a 
recipient. Risk factors are accounted for by the characteristics of target groups that are assumed 
to receive the different services. 
3.4 Equivalent income definitions 
When analyzing poverty and inequality among households of varying size and composition, it 
is necessary to adjust the measure of income to enable comparison across individuals. As 
discussed above, interpersonal comparison of income is typically achieved by using 
equivalence scales. We consider four different definitions of equivalent income, depending on 
whether we consider cash or extended income and how we adjust for differences in needs for 
non-cash income. The different definitions of equivalent income are displayed in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7 Alternative definitions of equivalent income 
Equivalent income  Income measure Equivalence scale 
Cash income (EU) Cash income EU scale  
Extended income (EU) Extended income EU scale 
Extended income (NA) Extended income Needs-adjusted EU scale 
Extended income (NPA) Extended income Needs- and price-adjusted EU scale  
 
Following the previous literature in inequality and poverty closely, we use the EU scale to 
adjust for differences in cash income needs. This yields the measure of equivalent cash income, 
which typically forms the basis for studies of poverty and inequality. To obtain the measure of 
extended income, we add non-cash income to cash income. In line with previous studies, we 
use the same scale to adjust for needs for extended income as is used to adjust cash income. 
Consequently, extended income is adjusted by the EU scale. Thus, the first step is to change the 
income measure without changing the equivalence scale. The second step is to change the 
equivalence scale for extended income by taking into account the needs for public services of 
different target groups. Needs-adjusted extended equivalent income is derived by using the NA 
scale from Section 2.3 to adjust for differences in needs. The NA scale is a weighted average of 
the EU scale for cash income and the NC scale for non-cash income. The NA scale assumes 
                                                     
6 In the child care sector we also utilize additional information about coverage in kindergartens on the municipal level. 
Estimated recipient probabilities in different target groups are used to draw the correct number of recipients for each 
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that the sector-specific price indices are constant across municipalities, which is a special case 
of the NPA scale defined in equation (2.19). Thus, the third step is to introduce price 
adjustment in the equivalence scale, so the needs adjustment is based on the NPA scale, which 
yields needs- and price-adjusted extended equivalent income. 
 
In order to empirically implement the NA and NPA scales, it is necessary to assign a value to 
the weight r  given to cash income, defined in equation (2.19). In particular, we set the 
minimum quantity of cash income for the reference group, 0r , equal to the minimum pension 
entitlement for a single person in the social security system. By doing so, we are assuming that 
the minimum pension for single pensioners equals the minimum quantity of cash income 
required for single adults below 67 years of age, i.e. the reference group used in the NA and 
NPA scales. We then estimate that r  should be 0.95. As a robustness check, we have set 0r  
equal to the EU poverty threshold derived from the equivalent cash income in the entire 
population. As the poverty threshold nearly equals the minimum pension entitlement for 
singles, our estimates of r  barely move. Therefore, we only report the results where the 
minimum pension is used to determine r .  
3.5 Measuring inequality and poverty 
Inequality measures. To summarize the informational content of the Lorenz curve and to 
achieve rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves, the conventional approach is to employ the 
Gini-coefficient. To examine the extent to which the empirical results depend on the choice of 
inequality measure, the Gini-coefficient is typically complemented with measures from the 
Atkinson or Theil family. However, the Gini-coefficient and inequality measures from the 
Atkinson or the Theil family have distinct theoretical foundations which make it inherently 
difficult to evaluate their capacities as complimentary measures of inequality. As demonstrated 
by Aaberge (2007), an alternative approach for examining inequality in the distribution of 
income is to rely on Gini’s Nuclear Family defined by 
(3.1)  1 2
0
( ) ( ) , 1,2,3kkC F k u u L u du k
    
                                                                                                                                                                        
municipality. Local public expenditure on child care is allocated equally to the simulated recipients. 
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where C1 is equivalent to a measure of inequality that was proposed by Bonferroni (1930), 
whilst C2 is the Gini coefficient. As demonstrated by Aaberge (2000, 2007) C1 exhibits strong 
downside inequality aversion and is particularly sensitive to changes that concern the poor part 
of the population, whilst C2 normally pays more attention to changes that take place in the 
middle part of the income distribution. The C3-coefficient exhibits upside inequality aversion 
and is thus particularly sensitive to changes that occur in the upper part of the income 
distribution. In this paper, we will examine the sensitivity of the empirical results to the choice 
of inequality measure by complementing the information provided by C2 with its two close 
relatives C1 and C3. Hence, we meet the most common criticism of the Gini-coefficient, namely 
that it is insensitive to redistribution of income at the lower end of the distribution. 
 
Poverty thresholds. We follow common practice in most developed countries and specify a set 
of poverty thresholds as a certain fraction of the median income. Specifically, we will focus on 
a set of poverty thresholds defined as 60 per cent of the median of the chosen measure of 
income. Recognizing the inherent arbitrariness of specifying an exact poverty threshold, it can 
be instructive to apply other thresholds to evaluate the robustness of the results. Moreover, by 
applying multiple thresholds one can obtain a fuller picture of the problem of poverty in a 
society. Thus we will supplement the analysis with poverty thresholds defined as 50 percent of 
the median of the chosen measure of income.7 
4. Distributional impact of public services 
This section examines the impact on inequality and poverty estimates of accounting for non-
cash income from local public services, and, moreover, adjusting for differences in needs for 
such services across individuals. 
4.1 Main results 
Overall inequality and poverty. Table 4.1 reports the income shares by decile for each measure 
of equivalent income outlined in Table 3.7. As the distribution of income may vary 
substantially within each decile group, we need to be cautious in drawing firm conclusions 
from Table 4.1 about the distributional impact of public services. With this caveat in mind, the 
                                                     
7 Following official poverty statistics in Norway and several other developed countries, students and wealthy individuals are 
not counted as poor. Because we lack credible data on wealth, an individual is classified as wealthy if he or she is registered 
with equivalent gross financial capital greater than three times the median equivalent cash income. 
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second column indicates that local public spending is quite redistributive, given the cash 
income shares reported in the first column. We find that the income shares increase in lower 
decile groups and decrease in higher decile groups when non-cash income is added to cash 
income. However, the third column suggests that substituting the EU-scale with the NA-scale 
in the needs-adjustment of extended income offsets some of the redistributional impact of 
public services. The final column shows that price-adjustment appear to have little impact on 
how needs-adjusted extended equivalent income is distributed across the decile groups. 
Table 4.1 Income shares by deciles for different income measures 
Income share by decile (%) 
Cash income Extended income Decile 
EU EU NA NPA 
1st 3.7 4.4 4.1 4.1 
2nd 6.0 6.7 6.3 6.3 
3rd 7.1 7.7 7.2 7.2 
4th 8.0 8.5 8.0 8.0 
5th 8.8 9.2 8.8 8.8 
6th 9.6 9.8 9.6 9.6 
7th 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
8th  11.6 11.4 11.6 11.6 
9th 13.3 12.7 13.3 13.3 
10th 21.2 19.2 20.5 20.6 
Overall mean 32 317 38 308 31 136 31 146 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted EU scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted EU scale. Income is reported in Euros (exchange rate of 9 
NOK per Euro is used). 
Table 4.2 Inequality and poverty by income measure 
Inequality Relative reduction in inequality (%) 
Cash income Extended income Extended income Indicator 
EU EU NA NPA EU NA NPA 
Bonferroni )( 1C  0.358 0.308 0.338 0.339 14.0 5.6 5.3 
Gini )( 2C  0.246 0.206 0.233 0.234 16.3 5.3 4.9 
3C  0.199 0.165 0.189 0.190 17.1 5.0 4.5 
Poverty incidence (%) Relative reduction in poverty (%) 
Cash income Extended income Extended income Threshold  (% of median) 
EU EU NA NPA EU NA NPA 
50  5.1 3.4 4.2 4.2 33.3 17.6 17.6 
60  9.5 6.9 7.2 7.1 27.4 24.2 25.3 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted EU scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted EU scale. The three inequality measures are calculated for 
each of the four equivalent income distributions. Poverty thresholds are calculated on the basis of median in each of the four 
income distributions. For each income measure, the relative reduction in inequality/poverty is given as the per cent decrease 
compared to inequality/poverty when cash income is used.   
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To investigate further the distributional impact of public services, the upper panel of Table 4.2 
employs the inequality measures outlined above. When comparing the first and the second 
column, we see that including non-cash income reduces inequality by about 15 percent. This 
suggests that public services are targeted toward individuals with relatively low cash income. 
However, as is clear from the third column, using our method to adjust for differences in needs 
offset about two-third of the inequality reduction stemming from the inclusion of non-cash 
income. Hence, the method used to make needs adjustment appears to be fairly important when 
drawing lessons about the redistributive nature of public services. Finally, column five 
demonstrates that allowing for variation across municipalities in unit costs for producing public 
services has little impact on inequality.  
 
When comparing rows 1-3, we see that the findings are fairly robust to the choice of inequality 
measure. Interestingly, the inequality measure that is most sensitive to changes in the lower part 
of the distribution, C1, records the smallest (percentage) reduction when applying the EU scale 
to extended income. However, the picture is reversed when using the NA or the NPA scale, in 
which case C1 records the largest (percentage) decrease in inequality. This illustrates that 
redistribution of extended income at the lower end of the distribution plays a more important 
role when using our method to adjust for differences in needs.  
 
The lower panel of Table 4.2 shows the share of the population with income below the poverty 
line according to the different definitions of income. We see that poverty rates are reduced by 
almost one-third, when we consider extended income instead of the conventional cash income 
measure. However, using our method to adjust for differences in needs offsets some of the 
poverty reduction, in particular when the relatively low poverty threshold of 50 percent of the 
median is used. This indicates that there is a concentration of individuals with low cash income 
who have relatively high needs for public services, which is ignored when one uses the EU 
scale to adjust extended income. Just as for the inequality estimates, allowing for variation 
across municipalities in unit costs for producing public services has little impact on poverty 
incidence. 
 
Poverty profile. Below, we investigate the impact of public services on the poverty profile. For 
brevity, we only report results using a poverty threshold of 60 percent of the median.  
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Table 4.3 Poverty profile in different population groups by income measure 
Poverty incidence 
Cash income Extended income Population group Population share 
EU EU NA NPA 
29 years or below 3.3 21.4 26.6 18.9 18.8 
30-44 years 3.9 15.8 21.6 13.5 13.5 
45-66 years 5.0 18.2 27.6 12.4 12.4 
Singles 
67 years or above 5.7 45.8 27.7 27.2 27.2 
29 years or below 1.3 4.4 5.9 4.1 4.1 
30-44 years 1.9 3.7 4.7 3.5 3.5 
45-66 years 8.6 2.8 4.6 2.0 2.0 
Couples 
(without 
children) 
67 years or above 7.0 9.1 5.3 5.0 5.0 
0-5 years 18.8 6.9 1.8 6.7 6.7 
6-17 years 21.7 2.9 0.9 2.5 2.5 
Couples 
(with 
children) 18 years or above 8.7 1.4 1.8 1.1 1.1 
0-5 years 1.8 29.2 5.3 24.3 24.1 
6-17 years 4.8 12.3 2.6 9.2 9.1 Single parents 
18 years or above 2.5 6.8 8.4 5.7 5.7 
Other households 5.0 6.2 4.2 5.5 5.5 
Non-immigrants 91.1 8.0 6.2 5.6 5.6 
Immigrants 8.9 24.9 14.2 23.1 22.9 
 Western 2.3 16.6 15.1 14.5 14,4 
Ethnic 
origin 
 Non-Western 6.6 27.8 13.9 26.1 25,7 
Urban 81.7 9.4 7.1 7.4 7.3 
 Oslo 11.7 13.1 9.3 10.6 10.5 Centrality 
Rural 18.3 10.1 6.4 6.4 6.7 
All population 100 9.5 6.9 7.2 7.1 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted EU scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted EU scale. Poverty thresholds are calculated as 60 percent of 
the median in each of the four income distributions. 
Table 4.3 shows the effect of accounting for local public services on poverty rates by household 
type. When focusing on cash income, the poverty rates are rather high among elderly (mostly 
female) living in single person households, due to the fact that the poverty thresholds exceed 
the guaranteed minimum pension. However, as elderly people receive a high level of publicly 
provided care and health services, their poverty rates drop radically when we focus on extended 
income. The same is true for households with children, especially single parents, since they are 
major recipients of services such as education and child care. For these subgroups, however, 
the poverty rates rise again when we use our method to adjust for differences in needs. Due to 
the age structure and the relatively high fertility rate of Non-Western immigrants, their poverty 
rates also decline considerably when non-cash income are taken into account. The relatively 
high levels of non-cash income also reflect higher needs for public services, as their poverty 
rates rise again when we make needs adjustment according to the NA scale. The groups that 
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receive the least non-cash income are singles and couples without children in the pre-retirement 
phase. The poverty rates for these households therefore increase when we consider extended 
income. However, their poverty rates fall when we use our method to adjust for needs. This 
finding comes as no surprise, as these households have no children who need child care or 
education, and their need for publicly provided long-term care is small. 
 
Table 4.3 also shows poverty incidence by centrality. The results show that incorporating 
public services into the income measure reduces the poverty rates in rural areas relative to 
urban areas and, especially, compared to Oslo. When we use our method to adjust for 
differences in needs, a similar pattern appears: While the poverty rate in rural areas is 
unchanged, we see that poverty rates rise again in urban areas (especially Oslo). This indicates 
that public transfers targeted towards individuals living in urban areas often reflect higher 
needs. 
 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the degree of overlap in individuals’ poverty status when changing the 
measure of equivalent income. We immediately see that accounting for the value of non-cash 
income and the method used to adjust for differences in needs not only change the poverty rate, 
but also which individuals that are classified as poor. Specifically, only 4.2 percentage points 
are poor according to all three income measures. The overlap in poverty status is largest 
between cash income and the extended income measure using our method for needs 
adjustment.  
Figure 4.1 Changes in poverty status for alternative income measures 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted EU scale. Poverty thresholds are calculated as 60 
percent of the median in each of the three income distributions. 
 
Cash income 
(EU) Extended income 
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(NA) 
4.2 
1.3 
2.4 
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88.6 
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4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
Balanced budget. In the analysis above, we have followed standard practice in empirical 
analysis of the distributional impact of public services in disregarding that the cost of their 
provision may differ from the direct taxes levied on individuals and households.8 In principle, if 
we include the value of public services we should also take into account the associated cost 
borne by the individuals. A possible concern is, therefore, that the direct taxes and the public 
expenditure on cash benefits and public services may not balance out at the aggregate level. 
Table 4.4 displays the aggregated direct taxes and public expenditure on cash benefits and 
public services in the ten service sector under study. We see that direct taxes fall short of 
covering public expenditure, producing a deficit of about 8.7 million Euros.  
Table 4.4 Aggregate direct taxes and expenditure on cash benefits and public services 
Budget component Euros (in million) 
Direct taxes 33 551 
–    Cash benefits 28 743 
–    Expenditure on public services 13 549 
= Surplus - 8 741 
 
In practice, it is difficult to assess whether an analysis of the distributional impact of public 
services can be given a balanced budget interpretation. This is primarily because the revenue 
and expenditure side of government budgets are detached, in the sense that particular 
components of expenditure are not tied to particular sources of revenue. Thus, it is not clear 
which type of expenditure is financed by which type of revenue. Moreover, the statutory 
burden of a tax does not necessarily describe who actually bears the burden of it. For example, 
Gruber (2005) argues that empirical evidence generally suggests that income taxes are borne by 
the households that pay them, payroll taxes are borne by workers regardless of statutory 
incidence, indirect taxes are shifted towards prices, and corporate taxes are in part shifted 
forward to the owners of capital but also borne by consumers and workers.  
 
On the one hand, a balanced budget interpretation of the results reported in Tables 4.1-4.3 may 
be justified if the economic burden of the deficit is already reflected in individuals’ observed 
cash income. In that case, the above analysis takes into account both the value of public 
services and the associated cost born by the individuals. This could be the case if employers’ 
payroll taxes finance the deficit, and workers bear the burden of such payroll taxes through 
                                                     
8 A notable exception is Garfinkel et al. (2006), who try to balance the expenditure on public services and the tax revenues.   
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lower wages. Alternatively, the deficit may be financed by corporate taxes, which could be 
fully shifted towards individuals’ returns from capital income. In addition, a balanced budget 
interpretation can be rationalized if someone besides the individuals finances the deficit, like 
the large Norwegian petroleum fund. 
 
On the other hand, a balanced budget interpretation of the results reported in Tables 4.1-4.3 is 
problematic if the deficit was, in fact, financed by indirect taxes on private goods. In that case, 
the above analysis includes the value of public service, but not fully the associated cost born by 
the individuals. As robustness check, we therefore assume that the deficit is fully born by 
individuals through value-added taxes (VAT) on private goods. In Norway, VAT on private 
goods is generally about 25 %, generating as much as 21 million Euros in public revenues in 
2007. Mirroring the proportional nature of VAT, it is necessary to deduct 8 percent from the 
cash income of each individual to finance the deficit of 8.7 million Euros. Table 4.5 reports the 
inequality and poverty results after deducing a proportional tax of 8 percent from individuals’ 
cash income. Since our poverty and inequality measures are scale invariant with respect to the 
chosen income measure, we know a priori that the estimates based on cash income are 
unaffected. However, this argument does not hold true when extended income forms the basis 
for the analysis, since it is the sum of cash and non-cash income. It is, therefore, reassuring to 
find that the poverty and inequality estimates based on extended income barely move when the 
proportional tax on individual cash income is introduced. Thus, the results are robust to 
alternative assumptions about how public spending is financed.  
Table 4.5 Inequality and poverty by income measure, assuming that value-added taxes finance 
the deficit 
Inequality Relative reduction in inequality (%) 
Cash income Extended income Extended income Indicator 
EU EU NA NPA EU NA NPA 
Bonferroni )( 1C  0.358 0.306 0.333 0.333 14.5 7.0 7.0 
Gini )( 2C  0.246 0.205 0.229 0.230 16.7 6.9 6.5 
3C  0.199 0.164 0.186 0.186 17.6 6.5 6.5 
Poverty incidence (%) Relative reduction in poverty (%) 
Cash income Extended income Extended income Threshold  (% of median) 
EU EU NA NPA EU NA NPA 
50  5.0 3.4 4.0 4.0 33.3 20.6 21.0 
60  9.5 6.9 6.8 6.8 26.9 28.0 28.3 
Note: All individuals are deducted 8 percent of their cash income. NA: Needs-adjusted EU scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted 
EU scale. The three inequality measures are calculated for each of the four equivalent income distributions. Poverty thresholds 
are calculated on the basis of median in each of the four income distributions. For each income measure, the relative reduction in 
inequality/poverty is given as the percent decrease compared to inequality/poverty when cash income is used.   
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Equivalence scale for cash income. Below, we discuss the results from a sensitivity analysis 
showing that our main findings about the distributional impact of public services are robust to 
the choice between two of the most used equivalence scales for cash income. While the results 
based on the EU scale are reported in Tables 4.1-4.3, Appendix B displays the findings based 
on the OECD scale.  
 
As shown in Table 4.6, the OECD scale gives the first adult the weight 1, with each additional 
adult given the weight 0.7 and each child the weight 0.5. Thus, the OECD scale places lower 
weight on economies of scale in consumption when considering household cash income 
compared to what the EU scale does. This implies that individuals from smaller households 
(singles or couples without children) would be evaluated as relatively better off when we use 
the OECD scale.  
Table 4.6 Needs-adjusted EU and OECD scales by household size and age composition 
EU-scale OECD-scale 
Unadjusted Needs adjusted Unadjusted Needs adjusted 
No. of  
adults/ 
children 
Age, 
years 
1 adult 2 adults 1 adult 2 adults 1 adult 2 adults 1 adult 2 adults 
17-29 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.7 1 1.7 
30-44 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.7 1 1.7 
45-66 1 1.5 1 1.6 1 1.7 1 1.8 
67-79  1 1.5 1.1 1.9 1 1.7 1.1 2.0 
80-89 1 1.5 1.3 2.2 1 1.7 1.3 2.4 
No 
children 
90-   1 1.5 1.8 3.1 1 1.7 1.8 3.3 
0-5 1.3 1.8 1.5 2.0 1.5 2.2 1.6 2.4 
6-12 1.3 1.8 1.7 2.2 1.5 2.2 1.9 2.6 1 child 
13-16 1.3 1.8 1.9 2.4 1.5 2.2 2.1 2.8 
0-5  1.6 2.1 2.1 2.6 2 2.7 2.4 3.1 
2 children 
6-12 1.6 2.1 2.5 3.0 2 2.7 2.8 3.6 
0-5  1.9 2.4 2.7 3.3 2.5 3.2 3.3 4.0 
3 children 
6-12 1.9 2.4 3.2 3.8 2.5 3.2 3.8 4.5 
Note: The EU scale with needs adjustment is a weighted average of the unadjusted EU scale and a needs scale for non-cash 
income (both defined on a household level). Similarly, the OECD scale with needs adjustment is a weighted average of the 
unadjusted OECD scale and a needs scale for non-cash income. The needs adjusted EU/OECD scales take account of both 
differences in household size and differences in needs for public services across households. In Table 4.6, households are 
categorized according to household size and age group of the youngest member in the household (for households without 
children, this corresponds to the youngest adult). Table 4.6 presents averages of the estimated needs adjusted EU/OECD scales 
for different households. 
The choice between OECD and EU scale for cash income also matters for the NA scale, 
defined in equation (2.17), since it is a weighted average of the chosen scale for cash income 
and the NC scale for public services. Table 4.6 provides a comparison of the NA scales for the 
two choices of equivalence scales for cash income. Compared to both the EU and OECD scale, 
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we see that the NA scales are relatively high for the elderly and households with two or more 
children, capturing that the needs for public services are particularly high in these groups. 
Moreover, the differences between the two NA scales mirror the differences between the 
OECD and the EU scales.  
 
As demonstrated in Tables 4.2 and B.2, the choice between the EU and the OECD scale affects 
the level of poverty. Because the OECD scale assigns less weight to economies of scale within 
households, the relative high incidence of low income among the smaller households implies 
higher overall poverty when using the EU scale instead of the OECD scale. It is also evident 
that the inequality estimates are slightly higher when we use the EU scale. But more 
importantly, we see that our main conclusions about the distributional impact of public services 
are robust to whether we let the EU or the OECD scale form the basis of the analysis. Including 
non-cash income reduce income inequality by around 15-20 percent and poverty rates by more 
than one-third, irrespective of whether we use the EU or the OECD scale. Moreover, adjusting 
for differences in needs for public services across population subgroups offsets much of the 
inequality reduction and some of the poverty decrease. However, Tables 4.3 and B.3 reveal that 
the impact of public services on the poverty profile differs somewhat depending on the scale 
used for some household groups. This mostly pertains to the poverty rates of singles and 
couples without children below 67 years of age.  
5. Conclusion 
As emphasized by Atkinson et al. (2002, p 103): “As the level and distribution of individual 
services does affect comparisons across households and across countries where the extent of 
state provision differs, social transfers in kind should in principle be included in the definition 
of income”. Most empirical studies of inequality and poverty, however, focus exclusively on 
cash income and omit the value of public services, which is worrisome given that about half of 
welfare state transfers in developed countries are in-kind (Garfinkel et al., 2006).  
 
Over the last few decades, a number of studies have addressed this issue, investigating the 
impact on poverty and inequality estimates of extending the income measure with non-cash 
income from public services. While these studies represent a significant step forward, a concern 
is that they use equivalence scales designed to account for economies of scale and differences 
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in needs for cash income, which are not necessarily appropriate when analyzing extended 
income. For instance, the elderly tend to utilize health services more often than younger people 
due to different health status, and children have a genuine need for education. Hence, the 
economic resources of groups with high needs for public services might be overestimated.  
 
A contribution of our paper is to relax the assumption that the relative needs of different 
subgroups remain unchanged when the definition of income is extended to include non-cash 
income. We also departure from previous studies in that the valuation of public services, 
identification of target groups, allocation of expenditures to target groups, and adjustment for 
differences in needs are all derived from the same model of local government spending 
behaviour. This theory-based framework provides a coherent method for evaluating the 
distributional impact of public services. In particular, our approach ensures internal consistency 
between the methods used for allocation and needs-adjustment. 
 
Combining administrative registers and municipal accounting data from Norway, we apply the 
proposed method to examine empirically the distributional impact of public services. The main 
insights from the empirical analysis may be summarized in four conclusions. First, including 
non-cash income reduces income inequality by about 15 percent and poverty rates by almost 
one-third. Second, adjusting for differences in needs for public services across population 
subgroups offsets about half of the inequality reduction and some of the poverty decrease. 
Third, accounting for the value of non-cash income and adjusting for differences in needs for 
public services not only change the poverty rate, but also the type of individuals that are 
classified as poor. And fourth, allowing for differences between municipalities in unit costs for 
providing public services does not change the picture of inequality and poverty. 
 
Whether these findings extend to other countries is an open question. However, the proposed 
framework for evaluating the distributional impact of public services might be employed also 
in at least some other countries, since it does not require information about spending on 
individual level or on specific target groups. All that is required is detailed knowledge about 
institutional features of the public service provision in the country of study, information on 
sector-specific expenditure by region, as well as sufficiently rich micro data, like censuses, to 
compute the socio-economic characteristics of the population in the various regions and to 
perform the distributional analysis. 
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Appendix A. Estimation of marginal budget share parameters 
Table A.1 Estimates of marginal budget share parameters 
Variable Service sector: Administration Primary education Other education Child care Health care 
Constant 0.226 (8.53) 0.091 (2.55) -0.007 (-0.76) -0.005 (-0.26) 0.046 (2.24) 
Average education level for 
persons 30-59 years -0.035 (-3.66) 0.002 (0.18) 0.009 (2.68) 0.018 (2.92) -0.003 (-0.38) 
Share of socialists in 
municipal council 0.009 (0.53) 0.002 (0.08) 0.008 (1.07) -0.021 (-1.52) 0.014 (1.18) 
Share of population in 
densely populated areas 0.001 (0.12) 0.021 (1.46) 0.000 (-0.06) 0.005 (0.56) 0.017 (2.48) 
Variable Service sector: Social services Child protection Long-term care Culture Infrastructure 
Constant -0.018 (-1.50) -0.017 (-1.42) 0.329 (5.52) 0.027 (1.63) 0.140 (4.00) 
Average education level for 
persons 30-59 years 0.008 (1.62) 0.009 (1.77) -0.043 (-1.89) 0.018 (3.21) -0.005 (-0.43) 
Share of socialists in 
municipal council 0.016 (1.79) 0.012 (1.29) -0.015 (-0.37) -0.025 (-2.42) 0.064 (2.64) 
Share of population in 
densely populated areas 0.005 (0.87) 0.002 (0.27) 0.025 (1.15) 0.011 (1.40) -0.073 (-4.13) 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. Number of observations = 378. 
Table A.1 displays the estimated coefficients of the marginal budget shares as specified in 
equation (2.7). The parameters in Table A.1 are estimated simultaneously with the parameters 
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 by the method of maximum likelihood. Note that marginal budget share 
coefficients for the residual sector, net operating result, can be derived from the coefficients in 
Table A.1, and from the constraints which secure that the sum of marginal budget shares over 
all sectors is equal to 1. It is found that the marginal budget shares are affected by education 
level, share of socialist representatives in the municipal council and population density. The 
higher the education level, the stronger are the local government preferences for child care 
services, other education and culture, while the priority of administration is low in well 
educated communities. It is found that socialist parties give high priority to infrastructure and 
low priority to culture and net operating result. Municipalities with high population density 
give high priority to health care and low priority to infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 36
Appendix B. Results based on the OECD scale 
Table B.1 Income shares by deciles for different income measures, OECD-scale 
Income share by decile (%) 
Cash income Extended income Decile 
OECD OECD NA NPA 
1st 3.8 4.8 4.3 4.3 
2nd 6.2 7.0 6.5 6.5 
3rd 7.1 7.8 7.3 7.3 
4th 7.9 8.4 8.0 8.0 
5th 8.7 9.0 8.7 8.7 
6th 9.5 9.7 9.5 9.5 
7th 10.4 10.3 10.4 10.4 
8th  11.6 11.2 11.5 11.6 
9th 13.4 12.5 13.2 13.3 
10th 21.4 19.2 20.6 20.6 
Overall mean 27 202 32 072 27 310 27 318 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted OECD scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted OECD scale. Income is reported in Euros (exchange rate 
of 9 NOK per Euro is used). 
Table B.2 Inequality and poverty by income measures, OECD-scale  
Inequality Relative reduction in inequality (%) 
Cash income Extended income Extended income Indicator 
OECD OECD NA NPA OECD NA NPA 
Bonferroni )( 1C  0.356 0.291 0.331 0.332 18.3 7.0 6.7 
Gini )( 2C  0.246 0.197 0.230 0.231 19.9 6.5 6.1 
3C  0.200 0.160 0.187 0.188 20.0 6.5 6.0 
Poverty incidence (%) Relative reduction in poverty (%)  
Cash income Extended income Extended income Threshold  (% of median) 
OECD OECD NA NPA OECD NA NPA 
40  2.6 1.6 2.5 2.5 38.5 3.8 3.8 
50 4.3 2.4 3.9 3.9 44.2 9.3 9.3 
60  7.9 4.3 5.8 5.8 45.6 26.6 26.6 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted OECD scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted OECD scale. The three inequality measures are 
calculated for each of the four equivalent income distributions. Poverty thresholds are calculated on the basis of median in each of 
the four equivalent income distributions. For each income measure, the relative reduction in inequality/poverty is given as the per 
cent decrease compared to inequality/poverty when cash income is used.   
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Table B.3 Poverty incidence for different population groups, OECD-scale 
Poverty incidence 
Cash income Extended income Population group Population share 
OECD OECD NA NPA 
29 years or below 3.3 12.4 13.3 14.0 14.0 
30-44 years 3.9 7.8 8.5 9.6 9.6 
45-66 years 5.0 5.9 6.9 6.6 6.6 
Singles 
67 years or above 5.7 8.8 6.3 8.1 8.1 
29 years or below 1.3 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.9 
30-44 years 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.5 
45-66 years 8.6 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 
Couples 
(without 
children) 
67 years or above 7.0 3.9 1.7 2.2 2.2 
0-5 years 18.8 5.0 0.9 4.1 4.1 
6-17 years 21.7 2.0 0.5 1.7 1.7 
Couples 
(with 
children) 18 years or above 8.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
0-5 years 1.8 17.3 2.1 10.7 10.6 
6-17 years 4.8 6.1 1.1 4.3 4.3 Single parents 
18 years or above 2.5 3.3 3.2 3.7 3.7 
Other households 5.0 4.0 2.0 3.8 3.8 
Non-immigrants 91.1 3.0 1.8 2.8 2.8 
Immigrants 8.9 17.4 8.4 15.3 15.1 
 Western 2.3 11.8 9.9 11.5 11.5 
Ethnic 
origin 
 Non-Western 6.6 19.3 7.9 16.7 16.4 
Urban 81.7 4.4 2.6 4.1 4.1 
 Oslo 11.7 8.0 4.6 7.0 6.9 Centrality 
Rural 18.3 3.6 1.7 2.8 2.8 
All population 100 4.3 2.4 3.9 3.9 
Note: All numbers are in per cent. NA: Needs-adjusted OECD scale. NPA: Needs-and price-adjusted OECD scale. Poverty 
thresholds are calculated on the basis of median in each of the four equivalent income distributions, and thereby depend upon the 
income measure and the scales used in calculating equivalent incomes.  
Figure B.1 Changes in poverty status for alternative income measures, OECD-scale 
Note: NA: Needs-adjusted OECD scale. Poverty thresholds are calculated as 50 
per cent of the median in each of the three income distributions. 
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